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SPECIAL ISSUE  
 
 
Criminal Justice after 9-11: ICC or Military Tribunals 
 
By Thomas Mertens* 
 
 
 
A.  Introduction 
 
Nowadays, widespread consensus exists that the dramatic events of September 11, 
2001 changed not only the country that suffered these attacks but also the way 
many in the West view the world outside this exclusive circle. For quite a number, 
it confirmed Huntington’s thesis of a clash of civilizations – a vision of a future of 
‘us’ versus ‘them’.1 But as the attackers were being identified, it became clear that in 
a sense they came from among us; although technically foreign nationals all, they 
lived and studied inconspicuously in western, multicultural societies.2 How are we 
then to deal with this enemy within? How is democracy to fight this so-called War 
on Terror3 and survive? Such questions are obviously not new. Bearing De Toc-
queville’s assertion in mind that a long war is not needed in order to put freedom at 
risk in a democratic society,4 this article, using the technique of a thought experi-
ment, seeks to examine the increased prerogatives that governments – fearing the 
enemy within – have granted themselves in the realm of criminal law to deal with 
                                                          
* Professor of Philosophy of Law, University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands. I wish to thank the partici-
pants of the conference on ‘Ethics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism’ at the ‘Zentrum for In-
terdisziplinäre Forschung’ in Bielefeld, October 2002, and its organiser, Professor Georg Meggle. I would 
also like to thank Aleksander Pavkovic and Morag Goodwin in particular.  
1 S. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 72 Foreign Affairs 22-49 (1993); B. TIBI, FUNDAMENTALISMUS IM 
ISLAM (Darmstadt 2000). 
2 Those who carried out and provided the logistical support for the 9/11 attacks had studied in Ger-
many, the United States, lived in the UK etc.; similarly, those accused of the Madrid bombings have been 
present in the country for a number of years and were registered at universities there. 
3 According to President Bush, the ‘war on terrorism’ is a ‘war’ on many fronts: foreign governments 
will have to choose between supporting the war on terrorism or not; terrorists’ financial networks will 
be dismantled; the military will be on the highest alert for a just battle; internal, domestic safety will be 
increased by a set of legal measures; and the perpetrators of these random killings and of the attack on 
civilization will be brought ‘to justice’. Taken from Bush’s State of the Union Address 9 days after the 
attacks: J.W. EDWARDS & L. DEROSE, UNITED WE STAND - A MESSAGE FOR ALL AMERICANS (Ann Arbor, 
MI 2001). 
4 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 621 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop ed., Chicago 
UP, 2000). 
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the perceived threat. This experiment will bring the reader, in a non-specialist way, 
from the criminal justice system of Germany to the possible role of an operational 
International Criminal Court, and from the criminal justice system of the United 
States to military tribunals as a means of dealing with what those in power claim is 
an extraordinary threat.  
 
B.  An Imaginary Case: Criminal Justice in Germany as ‘Rechtsstaat’ 
 
One of the frontlines of the so-called war on terrorism is the legal one: those re-
sponsible “must be brought to justice”.5 What follows is an attempt to envisage the 
path this legal battle might take.6 The main actor in this legal fantasy is Osama Bin 
Laden. Suppose he were to surface in Europe one of these days, say in Germany. 
He had managed to escape Tora Bora and the Afghan- Pakistan border long ago 
and, after much wandering along drug and migrant trafficking routes had ended 
up in Europe. He has assumed a new identity, built a new life inside the Fortress 
Europe, but as restrictions on the level of pressure that may be exerted on captured 
Al-Qaeda suspects are lifted, the intelligence agencies of the West – now co-
operating like never before – gain information as to his whereabouts.7 He is in 
Germany. Since the Security Council has declared that the attacks of September 11 
constituted a threat to international peace and security,8 and although the German 
Government has not been allowed an insight into the evidence against Bin Laden, it 
is willing to accept that he is the mastermind behind the attacks. Germany’s border 
control officers arrest Bin Laden as he attempts to flee the net encircling him. By 
doing so, Germany also fulfills its duty as a loyal member of NATO, as Article 5 of 
the NATO-treaty has been invoked. How could this highly implausible story con-
tinue?  
 
According to the rule of law, the German Government could not immediately put 
Bin Laden on a plane to the United States - washing their hands of a most embar-
rassing detainee - but must hold him in custody in a safeguarded penitentiary 
awaiting a request for his extradition. Although there are a number of extradition 
treaties between the US and Germany, a request by the US Government for Bin 
Laden’s extradition would not in fact be so simple a thing. Germany is a state party 
                                                          
5 EDWARDS, supra note 3. 
6 When this paper was first conceived the courts had yet to provide guidance as to the course they in-
tended to follow; the recent days of course have seen the German courts make their mark in the war on 
terror gratifyingly similar to the lines envisaged here. See Infra note 15. 
7 J. Lelyveld, In Guantanamo, The New York Review of Books, Nov. 7, 2002 (quoting an officer: “If we put 
them in the Waldorf Astoria, I don’t think we could get them to talk”). 
8 G.A. Res. 1368, U.N. (2001). 
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to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and to its Protocol VI, 
which forbids the administration of the death penalty.9 These commitments on the 
part of State Parties to the EHCR played an important role in a case that took place 
some time ago.10 An American NATO-serviceman stationed in The Netherlands 
had killed his wife in The Netherlands and had been arrested. The US requested his 
extradition based on the NATO-Status Treaty. That Treaty gives primary jurisdic-
tion to the sending State for this crime.11 To prevent his extradition to the US, he 
successfully appealed to The Netherlands’ obligations under Protocol VI, Art. 1 to 
the ECHR: “The death penalty shall be abolished. No-one shall be condemned to 
such penalty or executed.” That State Parties of the ECHR cannot extradite those in 
their detention to trial in countries where they are likely to face torture or inhuman 
and degrading treatment has been a mainstay of the Council of Europe legal order 
since the now-famous Soering judgment.12  
 
Bin Laden’s lawyers naturally call upon this important precedent. Additionally, it is 
argued that it is highly unlikely that their client will face a fair trial after all that has 
been said about him in the media. Article 6 of the ECHR requires that: “Everyone 
charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law” – a stipulation, it is alleged, that the US Government could not 
fulfill; even outside the US it is now received opinion, endlessly repeated, that Bin 
Laden and Al-Qaeda planned and carried out the 9/11 attacks. Finally, his lawyers 
argue that since September 11th the standard of civil liberties in the US has deterio-
rated significantly: hundreds of people are now detained without trial (contrary to 
the right of habeas corpus)13 and the confidentiality principle between lawyer and 
client – so integral to the integrity of the justice system – is no longer respected, as 
                                                          
9 In Unsere Erneuerung. Nach dem Krieg: Die Wiedergeburt Europas, Habermas cites the abolition of the 
death penalty as one of the defining elements of European identity. Habermas, Unsere Erneuerung. Nach 
dem Krieg: Die Wiedergeburt Europas, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, May 31, 2003. 
10 NJ, 1991, 249 (Short) (Dutch Case Law). 
11 North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 7, 3. 
12 Soering v. UK (1989); available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/. The Soering case is particularly 
pertinent as the applicant – a German national accused of the murder of his girlfriend’s parents – faced 
the death penalty if convicted in the US; the Court did not conclude that the death penalty per se was 
contrary to the provisions of Article 3 but rather held that the manner in which it was imposed or exe-
cuted or the conditions of detention whilst awaiting execution were two factors that may, dependent 
upon the circumstances of the case, constitute a breach of Article 3. The severity of the conditions in 
which detainees in Guantanamo Bay are kept leaves little doubt that the threshold of inhuman and 
degrading treatment would be met, even without the allegation that torture is a regular tool of interroga-
tion there. 
13 Y.B Eur. Conv. on H.R. Article 5; Article 9 ICCPR, and U.S. Const. amend. V. 
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such conversations and correspondence are now intercepted.14 In fact, there are a 
number of interesting terror related extradition cases currently underway, high-
lighting the difficulties regarding extradition of suspects from Germany to the US.15 
 
According to the thought experiment, the German courts show themselves fairly 
immune to political pressure, whether from the German Government or from the 
European Union eager to rebuild bridges with the US. And in the light of the above, 
it is fair to suppose that the request by the US for the extradition of Bin Laden 
would be refused. The German Government cannot but obey the ruling of the court 
and ends up with Bin Laden in its custody. So, what next for the world’s most in-
famous terrorist? 
 
C.  Scenario One: ICC 
 
Let us imagine that the German Government turns to the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), in an attempt to see Bin Laden charged with crimes against humanity. 
The German authorities argue that the 9/11 attacks fit exactly the definition of Arti-
cle 7 of the Rome Statute: “Crime against humanity means murder when commit-
ted as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian popu-
lation”16 and as anticipated by Article 14 (1) of the Statute.17 This description of the 
crime would fit the rhetoric of President Bush himself, that the attacks on his nation 
constituted an attack on civilization itself. Moreover, in his taped addresses to the 
world, Bin Laden has repeatedly called for an attack on all Americans without 
prejudice.18 For such crimes was the ICC established. 
                                                          
14 Provisions of the Patriot Act and the changes it brought are considered in more detail below. 
15 M. Hartwig, The German Federal Consitutional Court and the Extradition of Alleged Terrorists to the United 
States, 5 German Law Journal, 3 (2004), at http://www.germanlawjournal.com.  On the recent overturn-
ing of alleged terrorist convictions by the German Federal Criminal Court, see 
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/3/76BF1BD9-921B-4DDB-A5BC-28CC94328693.html;  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3592857.stm. 
16 In this respect, one can allege that the 9/11 crime falls into the same category as the assasination of 
8,000 Kurdisch civilians in Halebja in 1988 or that of 7,000 Muslims in Srebrenica in 1995, to mention 
only a couple of examples. It almost goes without saying that so far states have been far more efficient in 
the killing of innocents than any terrorist organisation. That Bin Laden should be tried on the charge of 
crimes against humanity is also suggested by G. ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY - THE 
STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 507-510 (2d ed. Harmondsworth 2002). 
17 “A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more crimes within the jurisdic-
tion of the Court appear to have been committed requesting the Prosecutor to investigate the situa-
tion.…” 
18 See Y. BODANSKY, BIN LADEN - THE MAN WHO DECLARED WAR ON AMERICA 279-280 (New York 2001) 
(1999). See also ‘… to kill the Americans and their allies - civilian and military - is an individual duty for 
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If the German Government chose to turn Bin Laden over to the ICC, it would opt 
for a court that was established by the Rome Statute, signed by 120 states (now 139) 
in 1998 and thus reasonably representative of the international community as a 
whole. The treaty establishing the ICC came into force, however, only in July 2002, 
following ratification by 60 states (now 92). To be sure, the ICC has no retroactive 
force and can only try new cases. In this thought experiment, the German Govern-
ment holds that the principle of nulla poena sine lege is nonetheless respected as al-
though the attacks predate the establishment of the court, the statute itself had al-
ready been signed.19  
 
In addition, the German Government maintains that the crimes with which Bin 
Laden is charged were already, prior to the Rome Statute, illegal under interna-
tional law. The definition of crimes against humanity, over which the ICC now has 
jurisdiction, was found in existing positive law, such as treaties (the Genocide and 
Geneva Conventions), precedents (decisions and rules of the Nuremberg- and To-
kyo-tribunals, and those of the more recent Yugoslavia- and Rwanda-tribunals), 
customary law and prevailing legal opinion (what some would call ‘natural law’). 
Often, as in the Eichmann trial,20 the issue of an international court has been raised 
in relation to crimes against humanity. With the high profile trial of Bin Laden, the 
ICC would have the opportunity to establish its reputation. Germany turns over 
Bin Laden to the ICC in the Dutch city of the Hague, which prepares to host the 
first major international trial of the 21st century.21  
 
The difficulties connected with an extradition to the US, such as the likely imposi-
tion of the death penalty and the near-certainty of a lack of fair trial and due proc-
ess are thus resolved. But a new major problem arises. It is unclear whether the ICC 
has jurisdiction, since it does not have universal jurisdiction automatically. There 
                                                                                                                                                     
every Muslim …’. The International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders, February 23, 
1998 at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm. 
19 A claim that places the German Government admittedly in direct contravention of Art. 11(1) of the 
Rome Statute. 
20 H. ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM 269 (Harmondsworth 1994) (1963) (concurring with previous 
similar comments by K. Jaspers). 
21 A salient but often forgotten detail in this context is the fact that ideas of an international criminal 
court as it functioned for the first time in Nuremberg do not originate from (the context of) the Second 
World War and the Charter of London, but rather from the First World War. After Germany’s defeat, an 
international tribunal was pursued, in particular to try the German emperor (under the slogan ‘Hang the 
Kaiser’, Treaty of Versailles, sec. 227-9). At that time, the Dutch Government objected. By not extraditing 
the German emperor, who fled to The Netherlands, and calling upon its neutrality, The Netherlands 
obstructed this first step towards international criminal justice. See, e.g., T. BOWDER, BLIND EYE TO 
MURDER 17-19 (London 1995) (1981); Robertson, supra note 16, at 225-6. 
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are a number of grounds upon which the ICC can try a case (Art. 13), for example, 
where the Security Council demands prosecution in its powers under Chapter VII, 
where a State Party refers a case and where the prosecutor initiates his or her own 
investigation. However, admissibility is governed by the principle that the national 
state of the accused or the state where the crime took place has the right to investi-
gate and try the suspect first; the ICC thus has jurisdiction only if the state of which 
the suspect is a national fails to prosecute22 – being either unable or unwilling –, or 
if the state within whose territory the crime is committed waives its jurisdictional 
rights (Art. 17(1)(a)). It is unimaginable, even in this flight of fancy, that the coun-
tries involved will defer their own jurisdiction in favor of the ICC. The decision of 
Saudi Arabia in 1994 to strip Bin Laden of his nationality has apparently left him 
stateless23 and it is unlikely that any state will claim Bin Laden as one of its nation-
als in order to give the ICC jurisdiction. Nor is it conceivable that the state in which 
the crimes were committed would waive its jurisdiction. The US, as is well known, 
opposes the ICC vigorously.24 Moreover, the US veto on the Security Council en-
sures that this body will not make the appropriate request granting the ICC juris-
diction.  
 
Yet, the Court can determine that a state is unwilling or unable to try a suspect and 
waive the principle of complementarity, where it judges that national proceedings 
“were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially” (Art. 17(2)(c)). 
It is highly unlikely, however, although not inconceivable that the Court would, on 
the same grounds that gave the German courts such cause for alarm, hold that the 
US could not offer Bin Laden an independent or impartial trial and assert their own 
jurisdiction. Such boot-strapping is not unusual for international tribunals; the In-
ternational Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) had to face similar hurdles 
                                                          
22 Robertson, supra note 16, at 350. This is the principle of complementarity. 
23 The story of the Saudi authorities stripping Bin Laden of his citizenship was carried by the BBC. Ku-
wait Disowns Bin Laden Aide, CNN, Oct. 14, 2001, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/middle_east/newsid_1599000/1599088.stm. However, an 
international arrest warrant for Bin Laden posted on the interpol website in 1998 lists his nationality as 
Saudi Arabian. http://www.interpol.int/public/Wanted/Notices/ (accessed 15th April 2004). 
24 Even though many argued that it is exactly the principle of complementarity that “offers a greater 
protection to American personnel than current international practice and/or status of forces agreements 
that uphold a sovereign nation’s exclusive jurisdiction to try and punish offences committed by persons 
of any nationality within its borders”, United Nations Association of the United States of America, 
http://www.unausa.org/dc/advocacy/iccfact.htm. In connection with this, this principle would also 
render obsolete the notorious and at first secret appendix B (granting immunity to NATO personnel 
from any form of arrest) to the unsuccessful Rambouillet- negotiations preceding the Kosovo war. 
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in Tadic,25 and successfully answered the questions about its jurisdiction.  
 
Moreover, the German Government argues that the US Government should be 
consistent: having supported the ICTY, it must support the ICC as well. Prima facie, 
this might seem a weak argument, but the attacks of September 11th and the con-
tinuation of horrific attacks on civilian populations around the world underline the 
necessity of ongoing international cooperation, not only as far as information and 
intelligence sharing are concerned, but also in the field of criminal law. If the Bush 
administration explicitly states that it considers these attacks to constitute a crime 
against humanity, it should, so it is argued, allow those accused of masterminding 
the attacks to be tried by humanity. Moreover, it is worth noting that Al-Qaeda is 
accused of more crimes than those committed in New York and Washington. As the 
whole of the international community is increasingly affected, the US cannot claim 
precedence over the rights of other countries to try the network’s mastermind and 
the truly international scope of Al-Qaeda’s reach means that the ICC is again the 
only place where justice for all their victims can be done.  
 
Germany is determined to see that such justice be done and hands Bin Laden over 
to the ICC in The Hague, relying upon the Dutch Government’s commitment to 
international law despite the difficulties this may cause them. In 2000 the US passed 
the so-called ‘The American Servicemembers’ Protection Act’, designed to protect 
“US military personnel and other elected and appointed officials (…) against crimi-
nal prosecution by an International Criminal Court to which the US is not a 
party”.26 The Act authorizes the president “to use all means necessary and appro-
priate to bring about the release of US personnel or other parties held by the ICC” 
(Section 8 a). Accordingly, were the Court to claim jurisdiction on the grounds sug-
gested above, it is not beyond the bounds of imagination to foresee a US raid on 
The Netherlands to free our suspect from the captivity of the ICC were the wishes 
of the US Government to be disregarded.27 
                                                          
25 Tadic Case (Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
The Hague, (1995) (published on the internet at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-
e/51002.htm.)  
26 http://www.unausa.org/dc/advocacy/iccfact.htm. 
27 Additionally, the Act forbids any cooperation with the ICC, on the level of intelligence cooperation, 
like handing over classified national security material (Section 6) on the level of physical extradition of 
suspects to the ICC (Section 4 c), and on the level of military support to countries that do recognize the 
ICC (Section 7 a). The US tries to circumvent the ICC’s jurisdiction by means of bilateral agreements, on 
the basis of article 98 of the ICC Statute: “The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or 
assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under inter-
national law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, 
unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity”. 
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D. Criminal Justice in the US Post- 9/11: General Situation 
 
For Bin Laden to find himself in the custody of the Americans, any number of 
events may have occurred. Imagine that German state officials do not respect the 
rule of law. Either the authorities hand Bin Laden directly over to the Americans, 
perhaps to the US troops stationed in Germany, or, more shockingly, decide that 
political and not legal arguments must prevail and put him on a plane to the States 
in contravention of the ruling of it’s own courts.28 Whichever route he has taken, 
Bin Laden is in US custody, facing trial in a criminal justice system that has 
changed radically over the course of the last few years.29 The principal changes can 
be summarized in three categories: measures in relation to domestic security, 
measures concerning the treatment of suspects of terrorism – this category consist-
ing mainly of detainees taken into captivity during the Afghan war – and finally the 
institutionalization of military commissions or tribunals, most likely to be charged 
with trying Bin Laden.  
 
I.  The domestic legal system 
 
In Bush’s legal war against terrorism, the most important change on the domestic 
front is the ‘USA Patriot Act’ (2001), an acronym for ‘Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Ter-
rorism’.30 This act aims to enhance domestic security and does so by introducing 
more than 1000 provisions concerning surveillance procedures on all kinds of in-
ternational money transactions, border control, criminal laws against terrorism, and 
information coordination.  
 
At the core of this Act stands a broad definition of ‘terrorism’ targeted specifically 
at non-US citizens. It gives greatly enhanced powers to both domestic law enforce-
ment and domestic and international intelligence agencies, and eliminates the 
checks and balances that previously gave the judiciary the opportunity to review 
the operation of such powers. If the attorney general has reasonable grounds for 
suspecting an alien of terrorism or aiding terrorism broadly defined, he may detain 
                                                          
28 Possibly using the slogan: “Fac et excusa” (act first and justify later), as, for instance, cited by I. Kant, 
Perpetual Peace -A Philosophical Sketch, in KANT’S POLITICAL WRITINGS 120 (H. Reiss ed., Cambridge UP 
1970). Moreover, for the German government’s ‘disappointed’ reaction to the FCC’s ruling on Mounir El 
Motassadeq’s case, see http://www.bundesregierung.de/-,413.616894/pressemitteilung/Schily-
Entscheidung-ist-zu-bed.htm.  
29 See also W.E. Scheuerman, Rethinking Crisis Government, in 9 CONSTELLATIONS 492-505 (2002). 
30 New anti-terrorist legislation has also been implemented in countries like the UK, France and Ger-
many, and in the EU as a whole. On Britain’s detention camp under this legislation, see 
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/waronterrorism/story/0,1373,1106664,00.html.  
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that person for seven days without any charge. If he then finds ‘the release of the 
alien will threaten the national security of the United States or the safety of the 
community or any person,’ this detainee may be held in custody for a much longer 
period, indeed, indefinitely. As a result, newspapers report regularly upon the de-
tainment of several hundred of people by the US Justice Department without con-
viction or based on minor charges unrelated to terrorism.31 Thus, as an alien under 
the Patriot Act, it is suggested that Bin Laden might be subject to indefinite deten-
tion without trial, held incommunicado, at the direction of the attorney-general.  
 
The most important argument in favor of such legislation as the Patriot Act says 
that the protection of individual rights, like liberty and privacy, cannot come at the 
cost of the safety of society as a whole. The attacks of September 11th suggested the 
need to find a new balance between basic rights and security, the latter being the 
prime objective of the leviathan. The US Constitution, along with certain rights 
guaranteed to all individuals,32 should not become a suicide pact. Securing the 
homeland, following such reasoning, justifies the enhancement of the executive’s 
powers and the corresponding reduction of the procedural rights of alleged crimi-
nals.  
 
In his important series of articles examining the state of this balance post-9/11, 
Ronald Dworkin acknowledges the importance of security, yet argues that it is mis-
leading to speak of finding a new balance between risks and rights, between secu-
rity and liberties. The question is not where our interests lie, he writes, but what 
justice requires. As a principle, government must treat everyone as of equal status 
and with equal concern, since every human life has a distinct and equal inherent 
value.33 This requires that a system of criminal law shall treat all equally in equal 
cases. If the system denies to one class of suspects rights that it considers essential 
for others, it acts unfairly. A system that nevertheless aims at doing so (as does the 
USA Patriot Act by specifically targeting non-US citizens) has to meet the following 
                                                          
31 See, e.g., S. Taylor Jr., Congress Should Investigate Ashcroft’s Detentions, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY (May 
28, 2002); R. Dworkin, The Threat to Patriotism, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (February 28, 2002). Today, 
such harsh detention regimes are also being applied to US citizens, like José Padilla, see, e.g., R. Dworkin, 
Terror & the Attack on Civil Liberties, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (November 6, 2003).  
32  Supreme Court decision 2491, 2500 (2001), in ‘Zadvydas v. Davis’ evidences that “the Due Process 
Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, (Fifth Amendment: “no person shall be held to 
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, (…) without due process of law”) See also R. Dworkin, 
The Threat to Patriotism, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (February 28, 2002); ACLU letter to Secretary of 
Defence Rumsfeld, January 15, 2002, 
http://www.aclu.org/NationalSecurity/NationalSecurity.cfm?ID=9301&c=111.  
33 See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW - THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 10, 25 
(Oxford 1966); R. Dworkin, Terror & the Attack on Civil Liberties, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (November 
6, 2003). 
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two requirements, so Dworkin argues. First, it must have the candor to admit that it 
is treating one class of suspects unjustly because of security reasons. Second, it 
must reduce this injustice to the absolute minimum by allowing only the smallest 
curtailment of traditional rights possible.34 The new legislation does not meet these 
two essential conditions. It rather testifies to the Bush administration’s general atti-
tude of putting American safety first, at the expense of what Dworkin calls the in-
ternational moral order that nations should respect even under threat.35 As a threat 
to US security, Bin Laden would undoubtedly find himself in special custody. Ar-
guably, however, it would not suit the Bush administration to keep Bin Laden in 
indefinite detention. Bush stated that the perpetrators of September 11th had to be 
brought to justice. What kind of justice would that be? 
 
II.  Foreign Nationals detained during the War on Terror. 
 
To imagine the most likely scenario of Bin Laden in US custody, it would be helpful 
to look at the fate of those already held in US custody. The second element of the 
US’s legal war against terrorism concerns the treatment of those foreign nationals 
captured in the course of the war on terror, mainly in Afghanistan and now in Iraq. 
Bin Laden would surely be the most important detainee of the War on Terror, but 
he is not the first. From the perspective of international law, matters seem quite 
clear: the treatment of detainees in any armed conflict is governed by international 
humanitarian law.36 The US considers itself at war and if one understands the at-
tacks of September 11th as the occasion of that war beginning, anyone arrested 
(read: taken prisoner) in connection with this war must be treated in accordance 
with the laws laid down in the Geneva Conventions. The designation of the actions 
of Al-Qaeda, except where members participate alongside more conventional 
                                                          
34 R. Dworkin, The Threat to Patriotism, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (February 28, 2002). 
35 See R. Dworkin, Terror & the Attack on Civil Liberties, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (November 6, 2003). 
36 The question of the applicability of the Geneva Conventions in the War on Terror is controversial and 
has been the subject of vast amounts of print. The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are clearly interna-
tional armed conflicts and, as all are parties to the Geneva Convention, the conclusion suggested here is 
that the Geneva Conventions as well as customary international humanitarian law apply in full; as 
McDonald and Sullivan note, international humanitarian law must be interpreted in light of the princi-
ples thereof, such as the Martens Clause of 1899, and that such guiding principles ensure the applicabil-
ity of the Geneva Conventions even in types of conflict previously unseen, such as a so-called War on 
Terror. McDonald & Sullivan, Rational Interpretation in Irrational Times: The Third Geneva Convention and 
the “War on Terror”, 44 HARVARD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 301 (2003). While the Bush admini-
stration clearly disagrees, they have failed to provide a legal reason upon which they base their decision, 
asserting instead that the Conventions are simply no longer relevant in this not-so-brave new world. See 
also  
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/0/C82A7582AE20DCD1C1256D34004AEA41/$File/Geor
ge+Aldrich_3_final.pdf?OpenElement. 
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armed forces in, say, Afghanistan or Iraq, as constituting part of an international 
conflict is obviously a controversial interpretation,37 but one which can turn to the 
designation by the Security Council of the events of 9/11 as a threat to international 
peace and security for support.38 Moreover, the Appeals Chamber of ICTY in its 
Tadic ruling set a standard for an armed conflict protected by the Geneva Conven-
tions as “protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organ-
ized armed groups”.39 It can be argued that the regular terror attacks claimed by 
members of the Al-Qaeda network in the period before and since September 11th 
meets the definition of ‘protracted’. Although contentious, it is thus alleged that Bin 
Laden has been detained in a situation of international armed conflict. 
 
Since we are dealing with a situation of war, most relevant here are the Third and 
Fourth Geneva Conventions,40 dealing with the protection and treatment of cap-
tured combatants during an international armed conflict - those entitled to Prisoner 
of War (POW) status - and with persons involved in an armed conflict who can not 
aspire to the high level of protection granted POWs, such as civilians, respectively. 
These two conventions aim at providing a certain status to every person involved 
in an armed conflict. Article 5 of the Third Convention thus reads as follows: 
“Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act 
and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enu-
merated in Article 4,41 such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Con-
                                                          
37 According to the State Department, Al-Qaeda is “not a state party to the Geneva Convention; it is a 
foreign terrorist group”. Status of Detainees at Guantanamo, US DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICY DOCUMENT, 
Feb. 7, 2002, http://www.state.gov/p/sa/rls/fs7910pf.htm.  
38 Security Council Res. 1368 at para. 1 (12 Sept. 2001). 
39 Supra note 25. Noëlle Quénivet, The “War on Terror” and International Humanitarian Law, available at 
http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/ifhv/news/Tashkent_Speech%20Quenivet.pdf.  
40 It is assumed, for ease, that it is accepted by all that Additional Protocols I and II have not attained the 
status of custom and thus do not apply (the US is not a signatory and nor are any of the parties against 
whom it considers its enemies). The application of the Protocols effects the definition of combatant but 
will not be considered here. 
41 Third Convention’s Article 4 enumerates: “A. Prisoners of war are …. 1. Members of the armed forces 
….; 2. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, …, provided that … (they) … 
fulfil the following conditions: (a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordi-
nates; (b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) That of conducting their 
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 3. Members of regular armed forces who 
profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power. 4. Persons 
who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, ….; 5. Members of crews (…) 
who do not benefit by more favourable treatment under any other provisions of international law. 6. 
Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms 
to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, 
provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war. B. The following shall like-
wise be treated as prisoners of war under the present Convention: ….”. 
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vention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribu-
nal.” Thus, all those arrested or taken prison are considered POWs until deter-
mined otherwise by a ‘competent tribunal’, whereupon they are either confirmed as 
such or fall under the protection of the Fourth Convention regarding civilian per-
sons.42 According to the Commentary of the authoritative International Committee 
of the Red Cross, these articles ensure that nobody in enemy hands can fall outside 
the law. The category of ‘unlawful combatant’ is not part of the Geneva Conven-
tions’ regime.  
 
This, of course, does not mean that those falling under these two Conventions, pro-
tecting POWs or civilians, cannot be tried by a court martial or a criminal court. The 
taking up of arms against the enemy during war does not in itself constitute a 
criminal offence. The question of ius in bello is not connected to the matter of ius ad 
bellum and thus the fact that hostilities were not announced by the organizers or 
perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks prior to them, does not affect their status once cap-
tured. Nonetheless, POW status does not protect a person from being charged with 
war crimes, crimes against humanity or common crimes; nor are persons granted 
civilian status under the Fourth Convention free from prosecution for such of-
fenses. According to convention provisions, however, both civilians and POWs 
must receive a fair and regular trial and each detainee is entitled to “the essential 
guarantees of independence and impartiality as generally recognized”.43 
 
The US authorities have not followed this generally accepted interpretation of the 
Geneva guarantees. From the outset, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld declared that 
the detainees were, as he labeled them, ‘unlawful combatants’ without rights under 
the Geneva Conventions.44 Those taken into custody by the US Army were trans-
ferred to Guantanamo Bay, a small Cuban strip that is legally speaking not part of 
US territory.45 For that reason, those detainees cannot appeal to ordinary American 
courts, for example, for a writ of habeas corpus, and standards guaranteeing a basic 
level of detention conditions are not applicable.46 This decision has been severely 
criticized, and the US Government has in the meantime moderated its position by 
                                                          
42 Or: ‘protected persons’, see J. Cerone, Status of Detainees in International Conflict, and their Protection in 
the Course of Criminal Proceedings, THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INSIGHTS, http:// 
www.asil.org/insights/insigh81.htm.  
43 Fourth Convention, Article 3; see also Third Convention, Article 84. 
44 See, e.g., http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2001/011212wolf&rums.pdf; See also 
http://www.us-mission.ch/press2002/0802detainees.htm.  
45 At the time of writing, some 650 persons from around 42 countries are being held there. 
46 In order to have the lawfulness of their detention tested by the court.  
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distinguishing between Taliban Government forces and Al-Qaeda fighters,47 and by 
promising to treat them humanely, “in a manner that is reasonably consistent with 
the principles of the Third Geneva Convention, to the extent that they are appropri-
ate”.48 Only recently, the US Supreme Court has decided to take on four terror-
related cases, two of which relate to the indefinite detention of non-US citizens at 
Guantanamo and the two others relate to the power of the President to designate 
US citizens as enemy combatants. Hearings are supposed to start shortly, with a 
decision foreseen for this summer.49  
 
While this concession to international criticism mitigates the earlier decision, there 
are several good reasons why the decision not to apply the standards of the Geneva 
Conventions is not simply unlawful, but unwise. Firstly, decisions on what status 
detainees should be granted must be decided by a court on an individual basis, as 
the US Government did during the First Gulf War, and not by way of classifying a 
whole group of persons; secondly, deviating from the Geneva system will work as 
a dangerous precedent and have adverse effects for all combatant parties including 
the American army;50 thirdly, circumventing international humanitarian law in 
order to obtain valuable information from imprisoned ‘terrorists’ is of no avail, 
since the duty to abstain from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment does 
not follow from this alone, but also from other sources of legal guarantees.51  
                                                          
47 This distinction might not work since some argue that Al-Qaeda was part and parcel of the Taliban 
Government, Robertson, supra note 16, at 478, 480, 496. See also Article 75 Geneva protocol I (ratified 
neither by the US nor by Afghanistan, but nevertheless regarded as customary law). For a different view, 
see A. Roberts, Counter-terrorism, Armed Force and the Laws of War, http://www.ssrc.org/sept 
11/roberts_text_only.htm (also published in 44 SURVIVAL 2002.  
48 US DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICY DOCUMENT, supra note 37. 
49 T. Mauro, High Court at Crossroads, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1076428374712; D. Cole, 
Goodbye, Menschenrechte, http://www.zeit.de/2004/17/Essay_Cole.  
50 Indeed, the US Government is quick to demand the application in full of the Geneva Conventions 
where its personnel are involved in quasi-legal situations. The capture of Army Chief Warrant Officer 
Michael Durant in the course of a US operation against the Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed – a 
non-state party to the Conventions – saw the US Government demand that his treatment be consistent 
with the provisions of the Third Convention. Details taken from McDonald & Sullivan, Rational Interpre-
tation in Irrational Times: The Third Geneva Convention and the “War on Terror”, 44 HARVARD JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 301 (2003)., who note futher, “If the Geneva Conventions are binding on Somali 
warlords, non-state parties must be granted the same protection.” McDonald & Sullivan, Rational Inter-
pretation in Irrational Times: The Third Geneva Convention and the “War on Terror”, 44 HARVARD JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 310 (2003).   
51 Despite White House legal Counsel Gonzales’s leaked memo that modern terrorism ‘renders obsolete 
strict limitation on questioning of enemy prisoners, quoted in: S. Taylor Jr., We Don’t Need to Be Scofflaws 
to Attack Terror, THE ATLANTIC ONLINE, (Feb. 5, 2002). See Third Convention, Art. 17. See also Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 5; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 7; Con-
vention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The latter 
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Thus, in conclusion, Bin Laden in US custody finds himself in a country in which 
the protection of domestic civil liberties for US citizens, but most especially for 
aliens, has been restricted to a considerable degree. He himself will be denied the 
protection of the Geneva Conventions. The refusal to apply the normal standards of 
either peacetime or war is justified by the contention that fighting terrorism is an 
exceptional situation, very different from both ‘ordinary’ situations of armed con-
flict and peace time, and that the rules of the legal game have to be changed accord-
ingly. This battle against terrorism demands new instruments, of which ‘military 
commissions’ or ‘military tribunals’ constitute the third element of this experiment. 
Bin Laden would very probably have to face justice in the form of such a commis-
sion. 
 
III.  Scenario Two: Military Tribunals 
 
Although some have suggested the contrary,52 the concept of ‘unlawful combat-
ants’, used for the Guantanamo detainees, cannot be found in the Geneva Conven-
tions, neither explicitly nor, it is argued here, implicitly. The concept has a different 
origin, one uniquely American , a point that will be elaborated below.  
 
Nothing in the war on terrorism has provoked as much criticism as Bush’s ‘Military 
order of November 13, 2001 - Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism.’53 Based on “an extraordinary, national 
emergency,” this Presidential order declares that any individual who is not a US 
citizen and whom the President reasonably believes to belong to Al-Qaeda or to be 
engaged in acts of terrorism, must be placed under the control of the Secretary of 
Defense and be tried exclusively by a military commission, established by the Sec-
retary of Defense and without application of “the principles of law and the rules of 
evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States 
district courts.”54 The suspects shall be detained “humanely” by the Defense De-
                                                                                                                                                     
prohibits in its Art. 2 (2) the use of torture under emergency situations. Moreover, McDonald and Sulli-
van argue persuasively that Art. 17 of the Third Convention does not prevent interrogation and suggests 
that the authorities could have interviewed detainees without needing to deprive them of POW guaran-
tees. McDonald & Sullivan, Rational Interpretation in Irrational Times: The Third Geneva Convention and the 
“War on Terror”, 44 HARVARD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 310 (2003).   
52 S. Taylor Jr., We Don’t Need to Be Scofflaws to Attack Terror, THE ATLANTIC ONLINE, (Feb. 5, 2002); J. 
Lelyveld, In Guantanamo, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, (November 7, 2002); A. ROBERTS, COUNTER-
TERRORISM, ARMED FORCE AND THE LAWS OF WAR. 
53 66 Fed. Reg., Vol. 222, 57833-57836; See also A. Arato, The Bush Tribunals and the Specter of Dictatorship 9 
CONSTELLATIONS 458-463 (2002). 
54 It could be argued that this order establishes some sort of rival to the International Criminal Court 
itself, since it seems to aim at anyone connected to terrorism among the more than 20 million non-
2004]                                                                                                                                     559 Criminal Justice after 9-11: ICC or Military Tribunals
partment until their trial before a military commission, a body composed of mili-
tary officers. This commission admits all evidence “as would have probative value 
to a reasonable person,” but proceeds in a manner which is consistent with the pro-
tection of classified information. Conviction will follow upon the concurrence of 
two-third of the members of the commission, to be followed by a sentence that may 
include the death penalty. Only the President or the Secretary of Defense can re-
view this conviction. The possibility of remedy “by any court of the United States 
or any State thereof, any court of any other nation or any international court” is 
explicitly excluded.  
 
After fierce criticism, the Defense Department promulgated, on 21 March 2002, an 
order in which the most extreme provisions have been removed: it introduces the 
presumption of innocence until a suspect is proven guilty beyond reasonable 
doubt; the possibilities for legal advice are extended; an unanimity vote is required 
for a death penalty; some kind of appellate review is introduced although still not 
by any domestic or international court; under certain circumstances, any such trial 
would be open to journalists and the public.55 These revisions constitute real im-
provement and a step in the direction of a fair trial, but reason for suspicion re-
mains.56  
 
Dworkin, for example, has argued that the public status of the trials is still dubious, 
since it might easily be held behind closed doors (even barring the accused himself) 
if classified and classifiable information is presented to the court and any possibility 
of appeal to civilian courts is still lacking. Even under these new procedural rules, 
an accused might be tried in secret and sentenced to death “on evidence that nei-
ther he nor any other outside the military has even heard.”57 In addition, the Penta-
gon’s chief lawyer has stated that the government might not even release accused 
terrorists who were acquitted by such a tribunal “if they were thought to be dan-
gerous.”58 This renders the effectiveness of these tribunals fully dependent on the 
executive, and their existence seems to violate one of the corner stones of the rule of 
law, the separation of the executive and the judiciary. These tribunals do not ar-
guably constitute a court at all but are merely an extension of the powers of the 
President, who acts either personally or through the officers he commands as 
                                                                                                                                                     
citizens in the US and all others in the rest of the world, see American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
Memorandum on Military Tribunals 4 (November 29, 2001).  
55 Military Commission Order No. 1, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, March 21, 2002. 
56 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3334823.stm  
57 R. Dworkin, The Trouble with the Tribunals, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (April 25, 2002). 
58 Id.; See also J. Lelyveld, In Guantanamo, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, (November 7, 2002). 
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prosecutor, judge, jury, and appeal judge. 
 
It is essential to distinguish these tribunals or commissions from the institution of 
military courts or court-martials, which are common in many legal systems.59 There 
are good reasons for having this sort of military justice. Sometimes, for example in 
times of war, there is a need for rapid adjudication near the battlefield, based on 
specialized knowledge. Even when war is not imminent, the differences between 
the military world and the civilian may justify the existence of specialized courts, 
which take seriously the demands of strict authority relationships, discipline, re-
stricted privacy and the use of lethal weaponry. Importantly, the fact that these 
courts exist, does not necessarily affect the quality of the trial itself. Generally, it is 
held that the US military justice system respects basic principles of fairness.60 And if 
it adjudicates its own soldiers in a fair way, nothing stands in the way of adjudicat-
ing by way of the same procedures foreign soldiers who are accused of committing 
crimes.61  
 
The military commissions have their roots in American history. Military commis-
sions are connected with the distinction between legal and illegal combatant. While 
legal combatants can indeed be tried before an ordinary court or a court-martial, 
illegal combatants may not be. These commissions have been used repeatedly by 
the U.S. in times of war. They were used during the American Revolution by 
George Washington, during the Mexican-American War in the mid 19th century and 
especially during the Civil War, where there may have been as many as 4000 mili-
tary commissions. This institution created the possibility of trying and convicting 
people who would otherwise have been released by civil courts, not because of 
their innocence but because of the sympathies of the jurors.62  
 
During the Civil War period, the use of these commissions was contested. In ‘Ex 
Parte Milligan,’63 Lamdin Milligan was convicted by a commission for serious of-
                                                          
59 C.L. Eisgruber & L.G. Sager, Military Courts and Constitutional Justice, http://www.utexas.edu/ 
laws/news/colloquium/papers/Sager-Eisgruber.doc; See also Robertson, supra note 16, at 502, 508. 
60 C.L. Eisgruber & L.G. Sager, Military Courts and Constitutional Justice, http://www.utexas.edu/ 
laws/news/colloquium/papers/Sager-Eisgruber.doc (referring to the Supreme Court’s Weiss v. United 
States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994)); A. Neier, The Military Tribunals on Trial, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS 
(February 14, 2002).  
61 Third Geneva Convention, art. 102. Of course, fighting a war itself is not a criminal offense, as the 
important difference between a soldier and a criminal is acknowledged. 
62 J. Dean, Military Tribunals, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20011207.html, and J. Wallace, 
Military Tribunals, http://www.spectacle.org. 
63 71 US (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).  
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fenses, including violation of the laws of war, while aiding the Confederacy. His 
conviction was overturned by a unanimous Supreme Court, which argued that he, 
as a citizen of a non-seditious state, could not be tried by a military tribunal and 
that regular courts were available to hear his case, in full respect of the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court said: “[U]ntil recently no one ever doubted 
that the right to trial by jury was fortified in the organic law against the power of 
attack. It is now assailed. [T]his right – the most valuable in a free country – is pre-
served to every one accused of crime who is not attached to the army, navy, or mili-
tia in actual service.” Thus, the jurisdiction of the military could not be extended 
beyond those who were actually serving in the military, to the civilian world out-
side.64 The Supreme Court also argued, although without unanimity, that only 
Congress, and not the President, could authorize detention without trial.65 
 
In order to justify the recent order, however, the government relies upon a later 
Supreme Court decision in which the use of military commissions was upheld. This 
is the now well-known ‘Ex Parte Quirin’ case.66 In 1942, eight Nazi saboteurs, one of 
them named Richard Quirin, landed on American shores in order to commit acts of 
sabotage. Mainly through deliberate negligence and by supplying the FBI with 
information, the saboteurs, none of them committed Nazis, were arrested without 
having caused any damage. President Roosevelt, however, demanded that these 
men be tried before a military commission and refused them access to a civilian 
court.67 The aim was that their trial be held quickly and in secret. Furthermore, the 
prestige of the FBI would be protected and the American public assured that their 
coastlines were well protected. The saboteurs were accordingly convicted by a mili-
tary commission and sentenced to death. The men’s lawyers contended before the 
Supreme Court that the military commission violated the US Constitution and the 
                                                          
64 Statement of T. Lynch, Cato Institute, before the Senate Judiciary Committee, at http://www.cato.org. 
It seems as if ‘Milligan’ allows only two kinds of justices: civil justice for civilians and military justice for 
those serving in the armed forces. Some argue that the critical stance of the Supreme Court in Milligan 
could have been prevented by better legal counsel on the part of the government, see Dean, Military 
Tribunals, supra note 62; R.G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT, 71-3 (3rd ed. 2000).  
65 This point was not unimportant as it is related to the fact that there was no official declaration of war 
or act of Congress on which the President could rely. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
66 Ex Parte Quirin, 317 US 1 (1942). For extensive details of the case, G. Cohen, The Keystone Kommando’s,  
THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY (February 2002); Furthermore, the government relies upon ‘Johnson v. Eisen-
trager’, a 1950 decision in which a habeas corpus petition filed by German nationals seized in China and 
held in a U.S. prison in Germany was denied by a court, the justices refusing to exert jurisdiction. See T. 
Mauro, High Court at Crossroads, at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1076428374712 
67 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Proclamation of July 2, 1942: Denying Certain Enemies Access to the 
Courts of the United States, FED. REGISTRAR 1942, 5, 103 (1942), quoted in Roberts, Counter-terrorism, Armed 
Force and the Laws of War, supra note 47.  
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precedent set by the Milligan decision, and requested a new trial. The Supreme 
Court, however, upheld the legitimacy of the military commission, arguing that the 
situation in the Milligan case was entirely different from that of Quirin. The Court 
held that “by universal agreement and practice the law of war draws a distinction 
between (...) those who are lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants 
are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military 
forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in 
addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts 
which render their belligerency unlawful.”68 Today, it is ‘Ex Parte Quirin’ that is 
cited as precedent.69 However, this decision is widely regarded as unsuitable to 
serve as such an important precedent. It is overtly reverential to the government70 
and the then- Supreme Court, operating in the tense period of World War II, did 
not have a good record on civil liberties.71  
 
The most likely fate for Bin Laden, were he to fall into American hands and not 
suffer summary execution, would be trial before such a military commission, fol-
lowed by the imposition of the death penalty. Following the closure of our thought 
experiment, the consequences of trying Bin Laden before a military commission, 
both in terms of practical advantage and of justice, will be considered. The Bush 
administration holds indeed that a category of ‘illegal combatants’ must be distin-
guished from the categories of ordinary POWs and ordinary criminals. Like the 
German saboteurs, terrorists are illegal combatants who sneak behind enemy lines, 
conceal their military affiliation, and have no regard for the laws of war. Since ter-
rorists thus violate the laws of war, they are to be tried before a special commission. 
Such a principled stance, it is argued, also has a number of practical advantages: in 
a trial by military commissioners, there is no risk of a jury being intimidated by 
terrorists; confidential and classified material, essential for the war on terrorism, 
                                                          
68 Quoted in Wallace, Military Tribunals, supra note 62. The Hague Convention would then protect only 
the former, but not the latter. 
69 See, for example, Neier, The Military Tribunals on Trial, supra note 60. 
70 See, for example, Dworkin, The Threat to Patriotism, supra note 31. 
71 Only two years later, the Supreme Court upheld the internment of Japanese Americans, in: Korematsu 
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In the Yamashita case, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), the Supreme Court upheld 
the legitimacy of the military commission trying the Japanese Commander of the Philippines, Yama-
shita. In this case too, the court held that procedural protections were not available to enemy combat-
ants. Two justices dissented here. Justice Murphy argued that the due process right mentioned in Fifth 
Amendment applies to all persons and that this was not respected in this case. Justice Rutledge argued 
that hearsay evidence of all type was admitted here which would have been excluded in a US court, and 
he complained that the universal protection of fair trial was violated. See Wallace, Military Tribunals, 
supra note 60. Moreover, the Supreme Court was unnecessarily hasty in its Quirin decision, giving judg-
ment only one hour after oral arguments had closed. 
2004]                                                                                                                                     563 Criminal Justice after 9-11: ICC or Military Tribunals
need not be disclosed to the general audience, but is only made available for the 
vetted commissioners; the risk of lengthy, time consuming procedures is minimal 
and the trial will not provide a platform for terrorist propaganda; in sum, one 
should accept flexibility with regard to the characterization of a fair trial.  
 
Many commentators do not find this principled stance or the practical advantages 
asserted very convincing. They argue that there seems to be no practical necessity 
to resort to military commissions. In the past, ordinary civil courts have success-
fully tried terrorism cases, such as that of Timothy McVeigh, or that of the 1993 
attacks on the World Trade Center. Legislation exists to successfully accommodate 
both the government’s wish for secrecy and the requirement that the accused be 
able to confront the evidence against him. Likewise, legislation has served to pro-
tect the identity and security of jurors in criminal cases against organized crime.72 
An ordinary trial might indeed be more time consuming, but this is what proce-
dural justice requires. Moreover, it is not evident that a long trial will serve propa-
ganda purposes: does the Serbian nationalist cause benefit from Milosevic being 
able to tell his ‘truth’ in The Hague?73 What would be the most effective way to 
neutralize Bin Laden? To have him tried, convicted and executed after a secret trial 
which would assure him of hero status in the eyes of many, or to subject him to a 
demystifying trial which would reveal not only the morally appalling consequences 
of his deeds, but also his and his organization’s hypocrisies and cruelties? An ordi-
nary criminal trial against Bin Laden would not focus on a so-called clash of civili-
zations, but simply on the ‘mens rea’ for the commission of a crime against human-
ity. It would reduce Bin Laden “to human stature.”74  
 
To the implausibility of the so-called practical advantages of military commissions 
many practical disadvantages can be added. Convictions reached by these commis-
sions might easily lack sufficient credibility, especially outside the US.75 This insti-
tution devaluates the earlier US critique of similar courts in other countries and 
makes any future critique look hypocritical.76 The use of these commissions will 
undermine the willingness of other countries to extradite suspects77 and aggravate 
                                                          
72 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (ACLU), Memorandum on Military Tribunals, under III. 
73 Cf. T. Judah, The Star of The Hague, THE N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, 25 April 2002. 
74 Robertson, Crimes against Humanity, supra note 16, at 509; One might also reconsider Hannah Arendt’s 
thesis on the banality of evil, in: Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, supra n. 20.  
75 Neier, The Military Tribunals on Trial, supra note 60. 
76 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Fact Sheet: Past US Criticism of Military Tribunals, at 
http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/11/tribunals1128.htm; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (ACLU), 
Memorandum on Military Tribunals, under V; Neier, The Military Tribunals on Trial, id. 
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the tension that already exists between the US and other countries because of the 
Order’s neglect of international standards for due process, as embedded in Articles 
14 and 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and due to 
divergent views on the death penalty.  
 
Whether sufficient legitimation for military commissions exists does not depend 
entirely on the lists of practical pros and cons. The argument in principle is deci-
sive, and that centers on the question of whether it is legitimate to distinguish be-
tween legal and illegal combatants. If acts of illegal combatants such as terrorists 
differ in essence from ordinary criminal acts and from ordinary war crimes, than 
this distinction is valid and prosecuting them before a military commission with 
restricted procedures is justified. But the main flaw in this reasoning is the question 
of quis judicabit. One cannot prosecute suspects before such a military commission 
unless there is convincing evidence that they indeed committed the atrocious acts 
that would characterize them as illegal combatants. The decision to try them before 
a military commission effectively declares them to be illegal combatants. Yet it 
should precisely be the commission’s task to establish whether or not they are “ille-
gal combatants,” guilty of “unlawful belligerency” or not. The use of military 
commissions violates the presumption of innocence. This flaw was apparent in Ex 
Parte Quirin: the reason why the saboteurs were refused a trial by jury was that they 
were accused of being “illegal combatants”. Despite their denial – at least two of 
them claimed that they were present on these missions solely to escape from Ger-
many – they were nonetheless turned over to a military tribunal and convicted. 
Although their determination as illegal combatants did not necessarily entail con-
viction, it reduced their opportunity to prove their innocence because of the proce-
dural restrictions applied. The institution of military commissions does not respect 
the principle that criminal procedural rules should be designed in such a manner 
that the risk of convicting someone who is innocent be as low as possible.78 
 
While the proponents of military commissions might admit such flaws, they would 
stress that the sort of terrorism seen on 9/11 is something completely new. As it has 
changed the world, it must change our standards of fairness. In ordinary criminal 
procedures and in ordinary court-martials, it is rightly assumed that it is better to 
set a hundred guilty persons free than to convict one single innocent person, and to 
accept the risk involved in this balance.79 With regard to terrorism, it is alleged that 
                                                                                                                                                     
77 Neier, The Military Tribunals on Trial, id. 
78 ‘As low as possible’, since a criminal trial exemplifies only imperfect procedural justice: it seems im-
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we simply cannot afford to take such risks. It is no longer, the proponents argue, an 
acceptable policy to let to the guilty go free for fear of punishing the innocent. A 
different balance must be found between the security needs of society and the pro-
tection of the rights of the accused.80 In this new era, it is, regrettably, better to con-
vict an innocent person than to let a terrorist go free.81 Such an argument plays on 
understandable fears and thus seems stronger than it really is. If the argument is 
turned around and one asks whether it would be acceptable to convict and sacrifice 
a hundred innocent people in order to “neutralize” one terrorist, the answer is less 
evident. However, if  national security indeed requires the curtailment of the rights 
of the accused, an argument not necessarily accepted, the government should aim 
at curtailing them as little as possible, and should publicly acknowledge that by 
doing so it acts unfairly.82  
 
E. Conclusion 
 
This piece is a thought experiment indeed. However, the likely outcome of Bin 
Laden in US control is clear. Yet the reason as to why the authorities would pursue 
a course so widely condemned, even by staunch allies83 and US citizens,84 and 
which would not necessarily bring the practical advantages claimed, remains to be 
examined. It would be too easy to presume on the part of the US Government an 
unwillingness to listen to good arguments and to attribute to the latter bad faith 
with regard to due process and fair trial.  
 
The preference in the US for military commission justice arguably stems from two 
interconnected reasons. Firstly, there exists a basic difference in the way in which 
the US and Europe have traditionally regarded international law.85 This is clearly 
                                                          
80 L.H. Tribe, Trial by Fur’, THE NEW REPUBLIC, 10 Dec. 2001, quoted in Dworkin, The Threat to Patriotism, 
supra note 31. 
81 J. Wallison, In favor of military tribunal, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, (3 Jan. 2003) available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com 
82 Dworkin, The Threat to Patriotism, supra note 31; C.L. Eisgruber and L.G. Sager, Military Courts and 
Constitutional Justice, supra note 59. 
83 The detention of British citizens in Guantanamo Bay placed real pressure on the so-called ‘special 
relationship’, although much of it behind closed doors. K. Ahmed and T. McVeigh, Terror camp Britons to 
be sent home, THE OBSERVER, 30 Nov. 2003. available at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/interna-
tional/story/0,6903,1096508,00.html  
84 Among others: S. Hoffmann, On the War, THE N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, 1Nov. 2001; T. Judt, America and 
the War, THE N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, 15 Nov. 2001. 
85 Compare, the American attitude towards the Kyoto protocols and the Johannesburg summit. The US 
has not ratified many widely supported conventions, such as the conventions regarding land mines, 
prohibiting discrimination against women, protecting the rights of the child and the Additional Proto-
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formulated by Habermas in his assessment of US policy both in Kosovo and, re-
cently, in the second Iraq War in identifying the dual elements of pursuing national 
interests and of promoting human rights at the base of US policy. With regard to 
actions in Kosovo, Habermas wrote that the US “conceives the international en-
forcement of human rights as a national mission of a world power which pursues 
this goal according to the premises of power politics. Most of the EU Governments 
see the politics of human rights as a project committed to the legalization of inter-
national relations”.86 While the EU stresses the need to embed human rights in in-
ternational law, the US is rather distrustful of international law and remains com-
mitted to its own standards. In connection with the recent Iraq War, Habermas took 
a stronger stance and initiated the engagement of leading European intellectuals to 
formulate a European answer to what he understood as American unilateralism.87 
 
Secondly, this division has been intensified by the way in which the attacks were 
and are perceived on either side of the Atlantic, and by differing views as to the 
best means to address this new threat. While Europeans do not deny the magnitude 
of the events of September 11th, they are not (yet) fully convinced of a fundamental 
transformation in the nature of international relations. For the US it seems, the en-
tire nature of the world they inhabit has changed; Condoleezza Rice spoke of a 
shifting of the tectonic plates of international politics.88 Much of course has been 
written and said on the different approach of the Europeans and the Americans to 
international relations since 2001 and it does not need repeating here; there is how-
ever a clear connection between the different understandings of the attacks and the 
different approaches to criminal justice for those caught up in these new hostilities. 
In his now well-read article “Power and Weakness”, one of the Bush administra-
tion’s house intellectuals Robert Kagan contrasted the Promethean tasks faced by 
the US in the real world of international anarchy with the European view of an 
ideal world regulated by binding international law.89 The disagreement, according 
to Kagen, boils down to an opposition between Kant and Hobbes. Kagan writes: “It 
is time to stop pretending that the Europeans and Americans share a common view 
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of the world, or even that they occupy the same world; Europe is entering a post-
historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kant’s Per-
petual Peace. The United States, meanwhile, remains mired in history, exercising 
power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international law and rules are unre-
liable and where true security and the defense and the promotion of a liberal order 
still depend on the possession and the use of military might.”90 This would indeed, 
if a fair characterization, explain much of the different attitudes revealed in the 
thought experiment.91  
 
Hobbes’ political vision is not the comforting story of a government dedicated to 
protecting a wide range of natural rights or to promoting ‘life, liberty and the pur-
suit of happiness’, but the discomforting story of a government whose legitimacy is 
derived solely from its capacity to guarantee its citizens’ safety and self-
preservation.92 In order to make this plausible, as we all know, Hobbes sketches a 
miserable picture of the state of nature, in which the life of man is solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish and short. The foundation of the “leviathan”93 brings an end to this 
miserable situation, but it does so only temporarily. The world remains a danger-
ous place and the leviathan’s safety is permanently threatened from the inside by 
disobedient acts.  However the “leviathan”  is especially at risk from the outside, by 
acts that aim at destroying the bonds of the leviathan itself. There is, so to speak, 
always the possibility of an ‘emergency situation.’ The concept of “illegal combat-
ants” would seem to fit well into Hobbes’ vocabulary: these warriors aim at de-
stroying civil society; they live in the state of nature, where civil laws, both domes-
tic and international, do not apply. If they are captured, leviathan does not need to 
grant them any rights: it may treat them humanely, but it is under no obligation to 
do so.  
 
Kant never accepted so “realistic” an interpretation of concepts such as the “state of 
nature” or the “social contract.” The latter does not give us a historical explanation 
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of the state, but informs us of how the state ought to be, according to Kant.94 He did 
not fear so much the return of the state of nature after the establishment of the le-
viathan, but the continuation of the state of nature between a plurality of “levia-
thans” or between “leviathans and ‘outlaws,” illegal combatants or terrorists in 
other words. This state of nature can only be brought to an end when these sover-
eigns form a League of Nations in which their conflicts can be resolved peacefully; 
the failure to form such an association will see them and their leaders place them-
selves above the law. The leviathan is thus not threatened by the return of the ille-
gal combatant, but by the absence of international law, which makes these “levia-
thans” themselves illegal combatants. International law, including international 
criminal law, must prevent that by considering all “individuals and states as citi-
zens of a universal state of mankind.”95 
 
Although military commissions and the ICC are juxtaposed by the differing visions 
of world order underpinning those that promote them, there is yet a commonality 
between the two individuals who have provoked this discussion. When concluding 
his September 20th State of the Union, President Bush expressed his confidence that 
God would watch over the United States of America. From the taped statements he 
has released, Bin Laden is apparently also fully convinced, using similar rhetoric, 
that Allah is on his side. Both invoke their ultimate “Sovereigns.”. Here lies the real 
danger, namely that in changing our societies according to the perceived needs of 
security, we face turning Kantian open societies into Hobbesian fortresses, and 
nothing will then in the end distinguish democracy from fundamentalist societies.96 
The fundamentalist Bin Laden may lose the legal battle, but he will win the political 
war if his opponents mirror fundamentalist values by accepting the view that this 
war is a clash between two equally justified leviathans. 
 
 
94 I. Kant, Reflexionen zur Rechtsphilosophie, 19 AKADEMIE AUSGABE 504 (No. 7740, see also 7737).  
95 I. Kant, Perpetual Peace - A Philosophical Sketch, 98-99.  
96 For a similar line of thinking, see R. Rorty, Post-Democracy, LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS, 1 Apr. 2004. 
